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Abstract
The author explores the role that Taylor-type rules can play in monetary policy, given the degree
of uncertainty in the economy. The optimal rule is derived from a simple inﬁnite-horizon model of
the monetary transmission mechanism, with only additive uncertainty. The author then examines
how this rule ought to be modiﬁed when there is uncertainty about the parameters, the time lags,
and the nature of shocks. Quantitative evaluations are subsequently provided. In particular, it is
shown that if the degree of persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve is not high, a simple rule
such as the original Taylor rule that offsets demand shocks and puts a relatively small weight on
inﬂation shocks may be an appropriate benchmark for the conduct of monetary policy.
Conversely, it is argued that if the degree of persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve is high,
then ﬁnding a Taylor-type rule that can act as a benchmark for monetary policy is likely to be
difﬁcult.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52
Bank classiﬁcation: Uncertainty and monetary policy
Résumé
L’auteur explore le rôle que les règles à la Taylor peuvent jouer dans la conduite de la politique
monétaire compte tenu du degré d’incertitude de l’économie. Il tire la règle optimale d’un modèle
simple à horizon inﬁni du mécanisme de transmission monétaire, où l’incertitude intervient sous
une forme additive. Il examine comment cette règle doit être modiﬁée quand il y a incertitude au
sujet des paramètres, des retards et de la nature des chocs et procède ensuite à des évaluations
quantitatives de la nouvelle règle. L’auteur montre en particulier que, si le degré de persistance de
l’inﬂation dans la courbe de Phillips n’est pas élevé, une règle simple telle que la règle initiale de
Taylor — où la politique monétaire contrecarre l’effet des chocs de demande mais réagit
relativement peu aux chocs d’inﬂation — pourrait servir de modèle de référence pour la conduite
de cette politique. À l’inverse, il pourrait être difﬁcile de trouver une règle à la Taylor pouvant
jouer ce rôle si l’inﬂation est très persistante.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E52
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Incertitude et politique monétaire1
1. Introduction
While a consensus has yet to be reached regarding the conduct of monetary policy, there is now
general agreement with Friedman (1960) that there is too much uncertainty about the economy to
ﬁne-tune monetary policy responses to every shock. At the same time, ﬁxing the growth rate of
the money supply once and for all, as Friedman advocated, is widely seen as unrealistic. Rather,
attention in recent years has turned towards simple reaction functions, such as the well-known
Taylor rules (Taylor 1998), which specify how the instrument of policy ought to be adjusted when
certain state variables deviate from equilibrium. These types of rules can be viewed as a
compromise in that while they prescribe exactly how the policy instrument ought to respond to
certain shocks, they also allow the responses to differ for different kinds of shocks. Still, one may
remain skeptical about the use of such rules in practice, either because they would have to involve
too many variables, i.e., too much ﬁne-tuning, or they would be overly rigid. This paper will
explore what role, if any, Taylor-type rules can play, given the degree of uncertainty in the
economy.
Clearly, some type of rule is helpful and perhaps necessary as a guide and benchmark for the
conduct of monetary policy. A rule promotes credibility and facilitates communication, both
externally with the public, and internally within a central bank during the decision-making
process. It conveys to the public not just the objectives of monetary policy, but also the way in
which the objectives will be achieved while providing policy-makers with a reference point.
A large body of work has sought to derive efﬁcient, simple Taylor-type rules within the context of
large macroeconometric models of the economy.1 Our approach is different in that we examine
how policy should respond to primary shocks in the context of small models that incorporate a
few broad stylized facts about the transmission mechanism. This approach implicitly concedes
that, at best, a rule can act as a benchmark for policy, and that judgment must be applied in every
period on a case-by-case basis to adjust the response to the particular characteristics of that
period.
Some stylized facts regarding the monetary transmission mechanism are widely accepted. For
example, interest rates affect output with a lag, and output, in turn, affects prices with a lag.
Others, however, are still hotly debated. This is especially the case with regard to the degree of
persistence of inﬂation, or the degree to which inﬂation expectations are backward-looking in the
Phillips curve. On the one hand, inﬂation appears to have been highly persistent over certain
1. See, for instance, Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999); Armour, Fung, and Maclean (2002); or Côté,
Kuszczak, Lam, Liu, and St-Amant (2002).2
periods. On the other, there are indications that the degree of persistence has trended downwards
over time, perhaps because of improvement in the conduct of monetary  policy. The degree of
persistence of inﬂation plays a pivotal role in our context, because the appropriate monetary
responses are sensitive to the calibrations and to uncertainty when this degree is close to 1, but
quite robust otherwise. The reason is that, with a degree of persistence that is close to 1, inﬂation
is almost non-stationary. Hence, given the lag between monetary actions and their effects on
inﬂation, small shocks to the transmission mechanism, or alternatively, small changes in the
speciﬁcation of the model or the policy objective, are quickly magniﬁed and have non-trivial
consequences. Accordingly, we single out the role of this parameter in our discussion.
The gist of our results is that, under the conditions of uncertainty usually encountered, if the
degree of persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve is not high,2 then a simple rule (such as the
original Taylor rule) that mostly offsets demand shocks and puts a relatively small weight on
inﬂation shocks may be appropriate.3
This conclusion stands in contrast with the results usually found in the context of large
macroeconometric models. Armour, Fung, and Maclean (2002), for example, ﬁnd that efﬁcient
Taylor-type rules usually involve a weight on inﬂation shocks that is substantially larger than the
value of 0.5 in the original Taylor rule (e.g., around 2.0). Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999)
ﬁnd that efﬁcient rules typically incorporate a strong persistence in interest rate movements. One
should note, however, that in these studies the efﬁcient rules are derived under the assumption that
policy-makers commit forever to the given rule, whereas the efﬁcient rules derived in our study
are better compared with time-consistent rules, in the usual sense that policy-makers re-optimize
policy in every period, letting bygones be bygones. We would submit that commitment to time-
inconsistent rules is unrealistic. It is not easy to justify monetary policy actions to the public if
these actions are dictated in some complicated fashion by objectives decided in the past. And
since digressions from the announced rule are inevitable given the complexity of the economy,
they are not easy to justify without the monetary authorities losing credibility. In these respects,
time-consistent rules are much more attractive.4
2. Let us say itis below 0.5 annually in the context of a fullybackward-looking model.
3. Although we do consider the case of open economies, our focus will be on monetary responses to
domestic shocks.
4. An interesting alternative approach explored in the literature is to show that the optimal rule with
commitment isequivalent to a time-consistent rule that isoptimal with regard to some redeﬁned
objective. Undersome conditions, for instance, itcan be shown that inﬂation targeting with
commitment isequivalent to price-level targeting without commitment (see Srour 2001).3
Conversely, it is shown that if the degree of persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve is high,
then ﬁnding a Taylor-type rule that can act as a benchmark for monetary policy may be difﬁcult.
Our analysis consists of ﬁve parts. First, we examine the optimal policy rule that obtains in a
small, stylized, closed-economy model of the transmission mechanism, with only additive white
noise shocks. Second, we examine the case where the model incorporates diverse exogenous
variables and shocks. Under these circumstances, it would be hopeless to design a practical rule
that purports to describe monetary policy responses to every possible shock. We show, however,
that the optimal responses to changes in the endogenous variables are independent of the nature
and behaviour of exogenous variables. In this sense, the simple rule found in the context of the
small model that incorporates few primary shocks can still act as a benchmark reaction function,
with the understanding that monetary responses must be assessed on a case-by-case basis to
consider exogenous shocks.
Third, we examine the case where the model’s parameters may vary in time5 and are unknown.
It can then be shown that the optimal policy again has the form of a Taylor-type rule, but its
coefﬁcients may also vary in time.6 Time-varying parameters, therefore, can seriously hinder the
use of a rule for monetary policy. Clearly, if the economy is in a state of transition, or if it is
frequently subject to permanent structural changes that alter the key relationships, then ﬁnding a
benchmark rule would be virtually impossible.
If the model’s parameters are relatively stable, however, even though they are time-varying and
uncertain, a benchmark rule might still be appropriate. Thus, it can be shown that if the
parameters’ data-generating process is stationary, then so are the coefﬁcients of the optimal policy
rule. If the model’s parameters can be considered to be i.i.d., then the optimal response
coefﬁcients are functions solely of the unconditional means and variances of the parameters’
distributions and are, therefore, constant. Moreover, in this last case, we show that if the degree of
inﬂation persistence in the Phillips curve is not high and under plausible calibrations otherwise,
the effect of this type of uncertainty on monetary policy is small. In light of these results, we argue
that the optimal rule that obtains when parameter uncertainty is ignored can be used as a
benchmark under plausible conditions.
5. Time-varyingparameterscouldbeaconsequenceoflearningabouttheeconomy,ofstructuralchanges
in the economy, or of omitted variables.
6. Forthisclaimtohold,learningmustbeassumedtobepassive.Also,strictlyspeaking,theoptimalrule
is notlinear, since the response coefﬁcients may be correlated withthe state variables. (See Chow
1975.)4
Finally, we examine the implications of the exchange rate channel in the case of a small open
economy such as Canada. One difﬁculty that arises in this context is the large uncertainty
regarding the pass-through effects of the exchange rate to domestic inﬂation and the uncertainty
regarding the interest-exchange rate relationship. We show, however, that under reasonable
calibrations, these uncertainties can, to some extent, be ignored. The reason is that, on the one
hand, in Canada, the pass-through effect of changes in the exchange rate to domestic inﬂation is
small and transitory. On the other hand, when determining monetary policy responses to domestic
demand shocks, what needs to be known is the combined effect of the interest rate and the
exchange rate on demand—knowledge of the exact interest-exchange rate relationship is not
necessary.
This paper extends the analysis in Srour (1999, henceforth referred to as [S]). While in [S] we
made use of strong simplifying assumptions, such as two-period horizons and strict inﬂation
targeting, this paper derives optimal solutions under general conditions and provides quantitative
evaluations of policy rules. We continue to use calibrated models, as in [S], since there are strong
indications that certain parameters of the transmission mechanism have changed over time, and
since calibrated models are amenable to running comparative exercises and investigating the
implications of uncertainty. However, we also verify some of the conclusions with the help of
estimated models.
In addition, we continue to use reduced-form, i.e., backward-looking, models, and we assume that
the objective of monetary policy is to minimize in every period the expected discounted sum of
(weighted squared) deviations of output from potential and inﬂation from the target. One reason
for using such models is tractability of the effects of uncertainty. Another reason is that no one
forward-looking model has yet been agreed on. Besides, in many cases, one can judge the
implications of forward-looking elements by examining a reduced-form model with alternative
values of the parameters.7 Nonetheless, the results are subject to the Lucas critique and must be
taken with caution.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the baseline model and derives the optimal
rule when uncertainty in the model enters only in the form of white noise additive shocks. We run
comparative static exercises with respect to the model’s parameters, paying special attention to the
degree of persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve.
7. For example, a hybrid Phillips curve that involves backward- and forward-looking inﬂation
expectations can for some purposes be approximated witha Phillips curve that involves backward-
looking elements and a constant.5
In section 3, we discuss the implications of other types of uncertainty, including parameter
uncertainty, model uncertainty, and data uncertainty. In section 4, the analysis is extended to a
small open economy with a ﬂexible exchange rate. Some of the results are veriﬁed in estimated
vector autoregression (VAR) models in section 5. Section 6 concludes and suggests directions for
further research. It would be particularly useful to discuss in some detail how the introduction of
forward-looking elements in our baseline model affect efﬁcient rules. In this context, it is also
important to come to some conclusion regarding which rules are more appropriate: time-
consistent efﬁcient rules or efﬁcient rules that obtain under commitment.
2. The Baseline Model




where  is the log of aggregate output;  is the log of potential output (assumed for now to be
constant); is the inﬂation rate; is the inﬂation target; is the instrument of monetary policy
(here identiﬁed with the one-period nominal interest rate);  is the real interest rate,
;9 is the equilibrium real interest rate (assumed for now to be constant); a, b, c,
and d are positive constants, ; and  and  are white noise random shocks. Of course,
equations (1) and (2) stand for a Phillips curve and an IS curve, respectively.
The main feature of this model is that the instrument of monetary policy acts on output with a
one-period lag. In turn, aggregate demand acts on inﬂation with a one-period lag, so that monetary
actions affect inﬂation only after two periods. This is roughly consistent with the empirical facts
in Canada if periods are chosen to be annual. The form of the Phillips curve implies that there is a
trade-off between output and inﬂation: an increase in inﬂation requires a temporary demand
contraction to bring inﬂation back to its initial level relatively quickly, that is, more quickly than
would follow from the mean-reverting character of inﬂation witnessed by the coefﬁcient a. The
coefﬁcient a, which measures the degree of persistence of inﬂation, can be thought of as a
8. ThisisthesamemodelusedbyBall(1997),Svensson(1997),or[S],exceptthattheirPhillipscurveis
accelerationist, i.e., .
9. denotes the expectational operator conditional on information at timet.
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measure of the degree to which the public is backward-looking with respect to prices or,
alternatively, as the degree of (lack of) credibility the public has in the inﬂation target.
2.1 The optimal rule
The policy-maker is assumed to minimize in each period t a discounted (weighted) sum of




 is the discount rate, , and  is the relative weight placed on output and inﬂation
stability, . The larger is , the greater is the weight placed on long-run costs. At the
limit, , only the long-run costs matter, in which case equation (3) is identiﬁed with the
unconditional expectation . The smaller is , the more concerned is the policy-maker
with inﬂation stability, the case  corresponding to what Svensson calls strict inﬂation
targeting.
If the central bank could control output directly, then equation (2) would be redundant, and it can
be shown that the optimal policy rule would have the form
,
where  is a constant that depends on , , and the parameters a and d, which measure the
trade-off between output and inﬂation witnessed in the Phillips curve.10 However, the central
bank can only affect output with a one-period lag. It follows that the optimal rule must, in fact, be
expressed as
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where measures the optimal speed at which the central bank ought to bring inﬂation
back to the target following a shock.
Using equations (1), (2), and (5), the optimum rule can also be written as
(6)
where , and .11
Elementary algebraic manipulation shows that k is a constant between 0 and a, and that it
increases with a. Likewise, the response coefﬁcients A and B in the optimal instrument rule (6)
can be shown to increase with a: a larger coefﬁcient a means that inﬂation is more persistent, and
therefore would return more slowly to the target level, ceteris paribus, and hence k will be larger.
For the same reason, a larger a requires sharper monetary responses to reduce deviations in
inﬂation, hence larger coefﬁcients A and B.
Similarly, one can examine the behaviour of k, and A and B, with respect to the model’s other
parameters. A detailed discussion is provided in Appendix A.
Unless otherwise stated,  is assumed to equal 1 from now on.
2.2 Efﬁciency frontiers
By deﬁnition, drawn in  space, the variances of output and inﬂation under any
policy rule are bounded (to the southwest) by the variances associated with the optimum rules.
The latter trace an efﬁciency frontier as the relative weight in the loss function ranges between
0 and 1.
Figure 1 plots the efﬁciency frontier under the assumption that
,
11. Alternatively, the rule can be expressed in terms of the nominal interest rate
, where , , and .
ka d k 1 – =
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Figure 1: Efﬁciency frontiers12
12. Owing to limited space, the efﬁciency frontier in the casea = 1 is not shown fully.


































Figure 1: Efficiency Frontiers
Notes: A = Alternative rule; T = Taylor rule.9
and the shocks to inﬂation and output, and , are uncorrelated and have variances equal to 1.0
and 2.5, respectively. This parameterization is roughly consistent with the Canadian data at an
annual frequency.13 The ﬁgure shows the efﬁciency frontiers when a takes the values 1, .5, and 0.
It also shows the outcomes for the standard Taylor rule (T),
*, (7)
and the Alternative rule (A),
. (8)
For example, when  and an equal weight is placed on output and price stability, i.e.,
, the optimum rule is
; (9)
the variances of inﬂation and output under this policy are 3.55 and 4.22, respectively; whereas,
under the Taylor rule, the variances of inﬂation and output are 5.2 and 4.91; and under the
Alternative rule, 4.89 and 3.47.
When considering the desirability of a particular rule, the policy-maker is concerned with its
relative efﬁciency (i.e., its position relative to the efﬁciency frontier) and the trade-off it involves
between output and inﬂation variability. Although the present model does not specify a value of
the relative cost of output and inﬂation variability (i.e., the weight  in the loss function), one
may deem unsuitable outcomes that involve a large trade-off between output and inﬂation
variability.14 One may therefore want to rule out, on practical grounds, those outcomes on the
efﬁciency frontier associated with too large or too small values of , e.g.,  or ,
for which a small increase in the variance of output can produce a large reduction in inﬂation
13. The covariance matrix of the shocks does notaffect the coefﬁcients of an optimal rule. Moreover, for
any linear policy rule such as equation (6), the variances of the state variables under that policy are
proportional to the variances of the shocks. So the variances in Figure 1 should be understood only up
to a constant of proportionality, say equal to . Of course, the relative variances of output and
inﬂation under one given rule, as well as the relative efﬁciency (as measured by the loss function) of
two different rules, may change if the relative variances of the two types of shocks change. For
example, a rule that responds little to output innovations can be more or less efﬁcient, depending on
whether output shocks are small or large. What ispertinent in the calibration, therefore, is that the
variance of output shocks is assumed to be 2.5 timeslarger than that of inﬂation shocks.
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variability, or vice versa. This has important consequences, since as will be seen, certain claims
are reasonable for mid-range values of , but unreasonable for extreme values.
Excluding the lower and upper tails of  amounts to excluding the more vertical and more
horizontal segments of the efﬁciency frontier. For example, for , the variance of output
under optimum rules varies between 2.68 and 11.25 when ranges over the whole interval ,
and the variance of inﬂation varies between 2.4 and 19.12; whereas, if one restricts  to the
interval , the variance of output varies between 3.5 and 5.36, and the variance of
inﬂation varies between 2.88 and 4.79.
As the degree of persistence of inﬂation, a, decreases, the range of the efﬁciency frontier shrinks.
In other words, for lower values of a, the exact weight, , placed on the relative cost of output
and inﬂation variability makes less difference. For example, as already noted, when , the
variance of output under optimum rules varies between 2.68 and 11.25, and the variance of
inﬂation varies between 2.4 and 19.12. When , the variance of output varies between 2.5
and 3.52, and the variance of inﬂation varies between 1.65 and 1.87. The reason is that the smaller
is  the degree of persistence of inﬂation, a, the less inﬂation shocks feed into future inﬂation and
the more the overall objective becomes identiﬁed with the objective of achieving output stability.
This is also reﬂected in a greater weight accorded to demand shocks relative to inﬂation shocks in
the optimal rule. For instance, when  and , the optimum rule is
.
Of particular interest is that, for values of a below 0.5, which are the values sometimes found in
empirical studies, the optimal response coefﬁcients, as well as the variances of output and
inﬂation, do not change signiﬁcantly with . In the limit case, , the efﬁcient frontier
reduces to a single point, and the optimal rule always consists in bringing output back to potential
next period, whatever the value of , e.g.,
.
Given the policy rule and the variances of output and inﬂation, one can derive the variance of the
real interest rate. In the case of optimal rules, this variance is larger, the greater the relative weight
on inﬂation stability (i.e., the smaller is ), since this requires a larger monetary response to
inﬂationary shocks: for , the variance of the real interest rate ranges between
approximately 1.78 and 19.95 over all values of , and it ranges between 2.79 and 5.95 when one
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Interestingly, the Alternative Taylor rule is found to lie almost on the efﬁciency frontier, and to be
unambiguously more efﬁcient than the standard Taylor rule. As noted in footnote 12, however,
this is dependent on the calibration of the shocks’ variances. If the variances were actually
speciﬁed to be equal, then the Alternative rule, which calls for an equal reaction to inﬂation
shocks and a stronger reaction to output shocks than the Taylor rule, can be shown to lead to a
higher variance in inﬂation than the Taylor rule. The reason is that, following an inﬂation shock,
although both rules respond equally initially, the Alternative rule subsequently slows the
convergence of inﬂation towards the target, since it responds more strongly to the induced output
gap. If inﬂation shocks are in large part responsible for the movements in inﬂation, i.e., if the
variance of inﬂation shocks is large enough relative to demand shocks, then the variability of
inﬂation will be greater under the Alternative rule than the Taylor rule. The relationship between
the magnitude of the response coefﬁcients in a monetary rule and the relative variability of output
and inﬂation is therefore not obvious.
3. Uncertainty
The analysis in the previous section assumes that, except for white noise, all the components of
the transmission mechanism and the loss function are known with certainty. The data are assumed
to be complete and reliable, and the nature of the shocks, the magnitude of non-observable
variables such as the output gap and the equilibrium interest rate, and the manner in which the
shocks and monetary actions are transmitted to the rest of the economy are all assumed to be
known with certainty. But this is hardly realistic.
To investigate the implications of uncertainty on the conduct of monetary policy, we assume that
the state variables are not observed, and the elasticities in the transmission mechanism, the nature
of shocks, and the weight in the loss function are uncertain. Formally, we suppose that the model




and the periodic loss function has the form
, (13)
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where all state variables are measured as deviations from their equilibrium values (which
themselves can be varying in time); the parameters , and  are random
variables; is a vector of diverse autonomous variables and shocks affecting the economy; and
, , and  are white noise shocks, .
Note that any innovation  in the economy can be decomposed into a component
forecasted at time t, which can be incorporated into the vector , and a white noise shock that
can be incorporated into the shocks , , and . Thus, through the terms and
, the model can incorporate the fact that different shocks may propagate differently
through the economy, and their effects are uncertain.
Decision-making is assumed to proceed as follows. At the beginning of every period T, policy-
makers gather data and form their beliefs about the state of the economy and its future outlook
based on all information available. More speciﬁcally, they form beliefs about the nature of the
shocks, the state variables , , , and  at time T,15 and the elasticities in the transmission
mechanism. The policy-makers’ belief about any particular parameter at time T is identiﬁed with
the model-consistent expectations of that parameter based on all the information available.
Learning can occur, but it is assumed to be passive (see below). The policy-makers then take
action that optimizes the objective function.
The solution to the optimization problem in full generality appears quite complex. We consider
the case of data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty separately. The proofs are provided in
Appendix C.
3.1 Parameter uncertainty16
Suppose that the state variables , , , and  are observed at time t, and that learning is
passive in the sense that actions taken at any time T or earlier are assumed not to affect the joint
distribution of , conditional on all information
available at time . (This would follow automatically if the series
 is independently distributed over time.)
15. The uncertaintyabout stems from the uncertainty about the equilibrium interest rate.
16. The implications of parameter uncertainty for policy were ﬁrst studied by Brainard (1967), and a
number of other authors since then (see Estrella and Mishkin 1998, Sack 1998, Svensson 1997, and
Srour 1999).
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Under these conditions, it can be shown that the optimum rule is to some extent of a Taylor form,
except that the response coefﬁcients may vary in time (see Chow 1975, ch. 10). The optimum rule
has the form
, (14)
where the response coefﬁcients  and  depend on the data-generating process governing the
parameters , conditional on information available as of time t; and the response
coefﬁcient  and the auxilliary scalar  depend on the data-generating process governing all
of the model’s parameters , also conditional on
information available as of time t.17
As a benchmark for the conduct of monetary policy, the above rule would be impractical unless
the response coefﬁcients on the most relevant state variables are relatively stable. The stability of
the response coefﬁcients in turn depends on the data-generating process governing the model’s
parameters. Since  is a vector of diverse autonomous variables—other than output and
inﬂation—affecting the economy, one cannot expect the process governing , or that governing
, and hence the response coefﬁcient , to be stable.
Except in times of structural transition, however, there are indications that the data-generating
process governing at least the parameters may be stable. This is apparent from the
consensus among central bankers regarding a number of key stylized facts about the transmission
mechanism. Furthermore, it seems safe to assume that the weight in the social loss function is
exogenously given, i.i.d., and independent from all the other parameters of the model. In that case,
one can without loss of generality replace  by its unconditional mean, and hence assume that
the weight in the social loss function is constant.
Accordingly, suppose that the data-generating process governing the parameters
is stationary. One can then show that the data-generating process governing the
response coefﬁcients  and  in the optimal rule is also stationary (see Appendix C).18
Nonetheless,  and  may vary in time, as the parameters  vary, and one
17. Thus,strictlyspeaking,theruleisnotlinear,sincetheresponsecoefﬁcientsmaybecorrelatedwiththe
statevariables.Forcompleteness,andbecauseofsomedifferencesinmodelspeciﬁcation,weprovide
a proof in Appendix C.
18. Ifallof the model’s parameters are stationary, then so are all
of the response coefﬁcients in the optimal rule.
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learns more about their values over time.19 However, if one learns about the changes in
 slowly, i.e., if by the time one learns about the past changes  in
, the current new values are unrelated, then for all practical purposes,
can be considered to be i.i.d. In that case (in particular if are
constant), then  and  can be shown to be functions solely of the means and variances of
, and , and hence constant. This is not surprising since, under the assumption of an
i.i.d. distribution, the dynamic evolution of changes in inﬂation and output is unchanged
regardless of the realizations of other variables or shocks in the model. Moreover, if the shocks
, and  are independent from the model’s parameters , then
.
One concludes from the above analysis that a certain amount of discretion, exhibited by a time-
varying coefﬁcient and stemming from the diversity and unpredictability of exogenous shocks,
is likely to be unavoidable. However, if there is an underlying core to the transmission mechanism
that is relatively stable, e.g., if the data-generating process governing the parameters ,
and is exogenous to the shocks affecting the economy, and changes in these parameters are not
very persistent relative to the speed with which one learns about the changes, then the coefﬁcients
,  will be practically stable and will therefore provide benchmark responses to output and
inﬂation shocks. Otherwise, a rule such as equation (15) cannot act as a benchmark for monetary
policy, and monetary responses must be decided essentially on a case-by-case basis.
3.2 Numerical results
Srour (1999) ([S]) relied on strong simplifying assumptions, such as the restriction to two-period
models and strict inﬂation targeting, to analyze the effects of parameter uncertainty on monetary
policy. It was argued, for example, that uncertainty about the interest rate elasticity of demand, c,
calls for more cautious policy responses to shocks, i.e., weaker response coefﬁcients in the policy
rule, than when no such uncertainty is present; whereas uncertainty about the degree, a, to which
inﬂation feeds into future inﬂation calls for sharper responses. Whether the effect of simultaneous
uncertainty about several parameters calls for more cautious or bolder policies than when no such
uncertainty exists depends on the relative magnitude of uncertainty about the various parameters,
and the correlations between the parameters, and is therefore an empirical issue. In this section,
19. For example, if the parameters are observed at timet,and they follow an AR
process where the innovations are independent from the model’s other parameters, then one can show
that and are functions of the realizations of as of timet. If changes in
are persistent, then changes in and will be as well, in which case a
benchmark rule would be impractical.
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we examine numerically the effects of parameter uncertainty on the optimal rule under much
more general conditions than in [S].
We assume that , and are i.i.d., uncorrelated with the shocks and , with mean
, and , and that there are no exogenous variables ( ). Under these
conditions, the optimum rule has the same form as in the case without parameter uncertainty, e.g.,
,
but the response coefﬁcients A and B are now complex functions of the variances of the model’s
parameters as well as their means, a, b, c, and d, and and . A and B can be evaluated
numerically.
Tables 1 and 2a, b, and c provide the optimal response coefﬁcients under the speciﬁcation
and a variance for the output gap 2.5 times larger than that of inﬂation. Four cases are considered:
no uncertainty; c alone is random with standard deviation 0.5 (hence its t-statistic equals 2); a
alone is random with standard deviation 0.5 (hence its t-statistic equals 2); and both a and c are
random, uncorrelated, and with equal standard deviation 0.5. For each case, Table 2 provides the
variances of output and inﬂation under the optimal rule as well as  the variances (denoted varc(.))
under the optimal rule that obtains if one ignores parameter uncertainty (i.e., the rule exhibited
under the no-uncertainty case in Table 1).
For example, when  and there is no uncertainty, the optimal rule is
, and the variances of inﬂation and output under this policy are 3.55 and
4.22, respectively. If, in fact, a and c are random with equal standard deviations 0.5, then the
optimal rule is , and the variances of inﬂation and output under this policy
are 9.95 and 12.25, respectively. Hence, the overall loss is 11.1, whereas the variances of inﬂation
and output under the previous rule, which ignores the uncertainty about the parameters, are 14.41
and 11.43, and the overall loss is 12.9.20
In general, Table 2 shows that, for , and for a given weight , the response coefﬁcients and
the individual variances of output and inﬂation may differ signiﬁcantly between the optimal rules
20. Notshowninthetable,whenbothaandcarerandomwithequalstandarddeviations0.5,andperfectly
positively correlated, the optimal rule is , the variances of inﬂation and output
under this policy are 13.35 and 18.58 respectively; and whenaand care perfectly negatively
correlated,theoptimalruleis ,andthevariancesofinﬂationandoutputare7.82
and 9.85.
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0.00 2.50 1.80 1.50 1.24 2.50 1.80 1.50 1.24
0.05 1.98 1.59 1.31 1.16 2.20 1.68 1.42 1.21
0.10 1.70 1.48 1.17 1.11 2.01 1.60 1.35 1.18
0.15 1.50 1.40 1.07 1.07 1.86 1.55 1.29 1.16
0.20 1.35 1.34 0.98 1.03 1.75 1.50 1.24 1.13
0.25 1.23 1.29 0.91 1.00 1.65 1.46 1.19 1.12
0.30 1.13 1.25 0.84 0.98 1.57 1.43 1.15 1.10
0.35 1.04 1.22 0.79 0.95 1.50 1.40 1.11 1.08
0.40 0.96 1.18 0.73 0.93 1.43 1.37 1.07 1.07
0.45 0.89 1.16 0.68 0.91 1.37 1.35 1.04 1.06
0.50 0.82 1.13 0.63 0.89 1.31 1.33 1.01 1.04
0.55 0.76 1.10 0.59 0.88 1.26 1.30 0.97 1.03
0.60 0.69 1.08 0.54 0.86 1.21 1.28 0.94 1.02
0.65 0.63 1.05 0.50 0.84 1.16 1.27 0.91 1.01
0.70 0.57 1.03 0.46 0.82 1.12 1.25 0.89 0.99
0.75 0.51 1.01 0.41 0.80 1.07 1.23 0.86 0.98
0.80 0.45 0.98 0.36 0.79 1.03 1.21 0.83 0.97
0.85 0.39 0.95 0.31 0.76 0.98 1.19 0.80 0.96
0.90 0.31 0.92 0.25 0.74 0.93 1.17 0.77 0.95
0.95 0.22 0.89 0.18 0.71 0.88 1.15 0.73 0.93
0.99 0.10 0.84 0.08 0.67 0.84 1.14 0.71 0.92
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Table 2a: Variance (a =1 )
no uncertainty c random with 0.5 standard deviation
var( ) var(y) loss var( ) var(y) loss varc() varc(y) loss
0.00 2.40 11.25 2.40 3.28 10.26 3.28 29.00 343.75 29.00
0.05 2.46 8.25 2.75 3.32 8.57 3.58 4.13 24.81 5.16
0.10 2.56 7.00 3.00 3.40 7.60 3.82 3.55 15.40 4.74
0.15 2.66 6.26 3.20 3.49 6.94 4.01 3.42 11.91 4.69
0.20 2.77 5.75 3.37 3.59 6.46 4.16 3.40 10.02 4.72
0.25 2.88 5.36 3.50 3.70 6.07 4.29 3.44 8.80 4.78
0.30 3.00 5.06 3.62 3.82 5.75 4.40 3.51 7.93 4.84
0.35 3.12 4.80 3.71 3.95 5.48 4.49 3.60 7.26 4.88
0.40 3.25 4.58 3.78 4.10 5.25 4.56 3.70 6.73 4.91
0.45 3.40 4.39 3.85 4.25 5.04 4.61 3.83 6.29 4.94
0.50 3.55 4.22 3.89 4.42 4.85 4.64 3.97 5.92 4.95
0.55 3.73 4.06 3.91 4.62 4.67 4.65 4.13 5.59 4.93
0.60 3.93 3.91 3.92 4.85 4.50 4.64 4.33 5.30 4.91
0.65 4.16 3.77 3.91 5.11 4.34 4.61 4.56 5.03 4.87
0.70 4.44 3.64 3.88 5.43 4.19 4.56 4.84 4.78 4.80
0.75 4.79 3.50 3.82 5.83 4.04 4.49 5.20 4.55 4.71
0.80 5.25 3.37 3.75 6.37 3.88 4.38 5.67 4.32 4.59
0.85 5.91 3.23 3.63 7.13 3.72 4.23 6.35 4.08 4.42
0.90 6.99 3.08 3.47 8.38 3.55 4.03 7.47 3.84 4.20
0.95 9.36 2.90 3.22 11.15 3.34 3.73 9.96 3.56 3.88
0.99 19.04 2.68 2.84 22.51 3.07 3.26 20.16 3.23 3.40
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Table 2b: Variances (a =1 )
a random with 0.5 standard deviation
var( ) var(y) loss varc() varc(y) loss
0.00 4.80 18.75 4.80 4.80 18.75 4.80
0.05 4.88 15.39 5.41 5.04 13.42 5.46
0.10 5.01 13.63 5.87 5.43 11.37 6.02
0.15 5.17 12.51 6.27 5.89 10.21 6.54
0.20 5.34 11.70 6.61 6.40 9.46 7.01
0.25 5.52 11.08 6.91 6.97 8.93 7.46
0.30 5.71 10.59 7.17 7.64 8.54 7.91
0.35 5.90 10.18 7.40 8.42 8.26 8.36
0.40 6.11 9.84 7.60 9.37 8.06 8.85
0.45 6.33 9.54 7.77 10.55 7.95 9.38
0.50 6.56 9.28 7.92 12.08 7.92 10.00
0.55 6.82 9.05 8.05 14.19 8.00 10.79
0.60 7.10 8.84 8.14 17.30 8.27 11.88
0.65 7.40 8.66 8.22 22.44 8.86 13.61
0.70 7.75 8.50 8.28 32.80 10.29 17.04
0.75 8.14 8.35 8.30 65.71 15.28 27.89
0.80 8.59 8.22 8.29
0.85 9.12 8.10 8.25
0.90 9.78 8.01 8.19
0.95 10.61 7.94 8.07
0.99 11.48 7.92 7.96
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Table 2c: Variances (a =1 )
a and c random with 0.5 standard deviation
var( ) var(y) loss varc() varc(y) loss
0.00 8.19 19.52 8.19
0.05 8.23 17.76 8.71 13.49 63.07 15.97
0.10 8.33 16.51 9.15 9.44 30.65 11.56
0.15 8.46 15.57 9.53 8.81 22.14 10.81
0.20 8.62 14.83 9.86 8.86 18.12 10.71
0.25 8.80 14.22 10.16 9.20 15.76 10.84
0.30 8.99 13.71 10.41 9.75 14.20 11.09
0.35 9.20 13.27 10.62 10.49 13.11 11.41
0.40 9.43 12.89 10.81 11.46 12.33 11.81
0.45 9.68 12.55 10.97 12.72 11.78 12.30
0.50 9.95 12.25 11.10 14.41 11.43 12.92
0.55 10.25 11.98 11.20 16.78 11.29 13.76
0.60 10.58 11.73 11.27 20.35 11.44 15.00
0.65 10.95 11.51 11.31 26.38 12.07 17.08
0.70 11.36 11.31 11.33 38.92 13.91 21.41
0.75 11.83 11.14 11.31 82.06 21.28 36.48
0.80 12.38 10.98 11.26
0.85 13.02 10.84 11.17
0.90 13.80 10.73 11.04
0.95 14.77 10.65 10.86
0.99 15.77 10.62 10.67
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that take parameter uncertainty into consideration and those that ignore it. However, for the
middle range of values for , the rules that ignore parameter uncertainty remain close to the
efﬁciency frontier. This is apparent in Figure 2, which plots the efﬁciency frontier in the case
where c is random with standard deviation equal to 0.5, together with the frontier associated with
the optimal rules that ignore the uncertainty about c. (The efﬁciency frontiers associated with the
other cases have similar qualitative properties.) Thus, ignoring parameter uncertainty seems to
lead more to a lateral displacement of the efﬁciency frontier rather than to a level shift. An
intuitive explanation is that taking parameter uncertainty into consideration amounts to some
extent to rescaling the relative weight on price and output stability.21 Consequently, the additional
overall loss implied by the optimal rules that ignore parameter uncertainty is not substantial.
Figure 2: Efﬁciency frontiers a = 1.0 and a = 0.5
21. For instance, taking uncertainty about the interest rate elasticity of demand,c,into consideration
amounts to placing more weight on output variability.
a21
Since smaller degrees of persistence of inﬂation tend to collapse the efﬁciency frontier, it is not
surprising to ﬁnd that for values of the degree of persistence, a, smaller than 0.5, one can safely
ignore parameter uncertainty of the order of magnitude considered above. This is also apparent in
Tables 3 and 4, which provide the optimal response coefﬁcients and overall loss under the rules
that take parameter uncertainty into consideration and those that ignore it, when and c is
random with standard deviation equal to 0.5. A more formal explanation is that the smaller the
degree of persistence of inﬂation, the less current volatility feeds into the future, and the quicker
the state variables can be brought back to equilibrium, hence the less parameter uncertainty ought
to matter for policy.
Our numerical results conﬁrm that whether parameter uncertainty calls for more or less cautious
responses depends on the relative magnitude of uncertainty about the various parameters.22 Here,
“more cautious” means smaller responses to shocks. Alternatively, caution can be deﬁned as
inertia, i.e., acting in a manner that deviates relatively little from past policies. Sack (1999)
showed that, under this alternative interpretation, if the uncertainty about the parameters stems
from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation, then in a sense it always calls for more caution.
That is, taking into consideration the statistical uncertainty attached to the parameters when
estimated by OLS over the past, leads to an optimal rule that is closer to the past behaviour of
monetary policy. This proposition is not inconsistent with our results, since parameter uncertainty
can be inherent in the monetary transmission mechanism and not necessarily due to econometric
estimation, and past policies can be either too weak or too strong to begin with, relative to the
optimal policy without uncertainty. However, it raises the issue of how to evaluate parameter
uncertainty. It does not appear easy to disentangle the uncertainty inherent in the transmission
mechanism from the statistical uncertainty arising from econometric estimation.
3.3 Taylor rules versus forecast-based rules
In Taylor-type rules, the instrument of policy is set as a function of contemporaneous variables.
Alternatively, one can consider forecast-based rules whereby the policy instrument is set as a
function of forecasted variables. As a matter of fact, since the objective function is a function
solely of expected (squared deviations of) inﬂation and output from equilibrium, the optimal rule
can always be stated as a function solely of forecasted future deviations of inﬂation and output
from equilibrium. In the context of the present model of the transmission mechanism, since
forecasts can always be expressed in terms of contemporaneous variables, Taylor-type rules and
forecast-based rules are completely interchangeable, except that in Taylor form, the optimal type
22. See Craine (1979) for an earlydiscussion of the effects of parameter uncertainty.
a 0.5 =22
Table 3: Optimal response coefﬁcients (a = 0.5)
no uncertainty c random with 0.5
standard deviation
yy
0.05 0.48 1.18 0.32 0.90
0.10 0.38 1.11 0.27 0.85
0.15 0.32 1.05 0.22 0.82
0.20 0.27 1.01 0.19 0.79
0.25 0.23 0.98 0.16 0.77
0.30 0.19 0.96 0.14 0.75
0.35 0.17 0.93 0.12 0.74
0.40 0.14 0.91 0.11 0.72
0.45 0.12 0.90 0.09 0.71
0.50 0.11 0.88 0.08 0.70
0.55 0.09 0.87 0.07 0.69
0.60 0.08 0.86 0.06 0.68
0.65 0.06 0.85 0.05 0.68
0.70 0.05 0.84 0.04 0.67
0.75 0.04 0.83 0.03 0.66
0.80 0.03 0.82 0.02 0.66
0.85 0.02 0.82 0.02 0.65
0.90 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.65
0.95 0.01 0.81 0.01 0.64
0.99 0.48 1.18 0.32 0.90
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Table 4: Variances (a = 0.5)
c random with 0.5 standard deviation
alpha var( ) var(y) loss varc() varc(y) loss
0.05 1.86 3.38 1.93 1.91 4.91 2.06
0.10 1.87 3.22 2.00 1.88 4.24 2.11
0.15 1.88 3.12 2.07 1.87 3.88 2.17
0.20 1.90 3.06 2.13 1.87 3.66 2.22
0.25 1.91 3.01 2.19 1.87 3.50 2.28
0.30 1.92 2.97 2.24 1.87 3.39 2.33
0.35 1.94 2.95 2.29 1.88 3.31 2.38
0.40 1.95 2.93 2.34 1.89 3.24 2.43
0.45 1.96 2.91 2.39 1.90 3.19 2.48
0.50 1.97 2.90 2.44 1.903 3.15 2.53
0.55 1.98 2.89 2.48 1.91 3.12 2.58
0.60 1.99 2.88 2.53 1.92 3.09 2.62
0.65 2.00 2.88 2.57 1.93 3.07 2.67
0.70 2.01 2.88 2.61 1.93 3.05 2.71
0.75 2.02 2.87 2.66 1.94 3.03 2.76
0.80 2.02 2.87 2.70 1.94 3.02 2.80
0.85 2.03 2.87 2.74 1.95 3.00 2.85
0.90 2.04 2.87 2.78 1.96 2.99 2.89
0.95 2.04 2.87 2.83 1.96 2.98 2.93
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rule must involve all of the contemporaneous variables, including the exogenous variables, ,
since they help forecast future deviations in inﬂation and output from equilibrium. The forecast-
based version of the optimal rule, on the other hand, does not have to refer explicitly to the
exogenous variables .
In fact, the forecast-based rule needs to refer to forecasts of inﬂation and output only up to the
horizon over which the changes in the exogenous variables are expected to persist, since forecasts
of inﬂation and output up to that horizon are sufﬁcient to forecast inﬂation and output at all
horizons. Thus, for a country such as Canada, where the exogenous variables are mainly variables
that describe commodity prices or the state of the economy in the United States, and that are
expected to return to equilibrium within a two- to three-year period, the forecast-based optimal
rule needs to refer only to forecasted deviations of inﬂation and output up to a two- to three-year
horizon.
The forecast-based version can therefore provide a more parsimonious representation of the
optimal rule than the Taylor-type version, and furthermore, should be more efﬁcient than simple
Taylor-type rules that ignore changes in exogenous variables.23 However, this apparent advantage
of forecast-based rules must be strongly qualiﬁed by the fact that, in order to implement these
rules, one must use the full model anyway to evaluate the forecasts, and that requires taking into
consideration changes in all the variables in the model, including the exogenous ones.
3.4 Model uncertainty
Suppose that there are several possible models of the transmission mechanism, only one of which
is true. (The alternative models are all backward-looking, but differ with respect to the elasticities
attached to the variables.) What then is the optimum rule for monetary policy?
One can tackle this question within the framework described above if one approaches the problem
from a Bayesian perspective. That is, one ﬁrst assigns a probability to each model of being the
true model, and then one applies the analysis above to derive the optimum rule under the assigned
parameter uncertainty.24
There is an important caveat to this approach, however. Under the formulation of the objective
function used in the previous sections, what matters for welfare are the ex ante expected
23. Indeed, Armour, Fung, and Maclean (2002) ﬁnd that in the Quarterly Projection Model used at the
BankofCanada,inﬂation-forecast-basedrulesdosigniﬁcantlybetterthanTaylor-typeruleswherethe
policy instrument responds to deviations of output and inﬂation from equilibrium.
24. Note that it also depends on subjective beliefs.
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deviations in the state variables. A rationale is that the uncertainty about the outcome results in a
welfare cost. However, one can argue that what matters for welfare are the deviations that take
place, i.e., the deviations ex post. In that case, any given monetary policy must be evaluated
separately in each model. The true welfare function is likely to combine both ex ante expectations,
arising from, for instance, risk aversion, and ex post deviations resulting from the direct effects of
disequilibrium on welfare.25
3.5 Data uncertainty
Suppose now that the parameters , and  are known and constant,26 but
the state variables , , , and are not observed at time t: let , and denote their
forecast errors respectively (e.g., ). It is well known that as an immediate
consequence of the certainty-equivalence property of the model, the optimum rule under these
conditions has the form
, (15)
where coefﬁcients , , and are identical to those obtained when there is no data uncertainty.
Thus, data uncertainty has no bearing on the optimum monetary policy rule. Of course, the larger
the uncertainty about the data, the less reliable are the forecasts, , and , and
the greater the potential for error, but the optimal response to the forecasts remains the same.
The same conclusion, however, may not be true if policies are restricted to a particular form (e.g.,
Taylor-type rules with a restricted number of variables), or if policies are formulated in terms of
some measure of the state variables that does not use all relevant information. In that case, data
uncertainty may require either stronger or weaker responses to shocks than in the certainty case,
depending on the type of policy.
To illustrate, suppose that the true value of  is observed, but not the output gap, and that the
monetary rules pursued by the central bank are of the form
25. It is not immediately clear how the two approaches relate toeach other. For example, it is notclear
whether a rule that is found to be efﬁcient in everymodel separately would be efﬁcient with respect to
minimizing ex ante variability, and vice versa. One attractive feature of the approach based on
parameter uncertainty isthat it provides an already established framework within which to derive an
efﬁcient rule under model uncertainty. Moreover, because of the quadratic form of the loss function,
such a rule wouldautomatically putmore weight on avoiding worst case scenarios,as intuition would
suggest.
26. In fact, we need onlythe parameters to be known and constant.
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,
where  is a forecast of the output gap that does not use all available information. Then,
a priori, it is unclear how the optimal coefﬁcients and would relate to the coefﬁcients and
 that would be optimal if the output gap is in fact observed. For instance, if  is based on a
measure of potential output that relies mostly on past observations of output, as is the case with
many ﬁlter-based measures, on the one hand, the larger the uncertainty about the output gap, the
larger the weight  one may want to place on contemporaneous inﬂation, on the basis that
contemporaneous inﬂation becomes a relatively more reliable indicator for the output gap. On the
other hand, contemporaneous inﬂation may not be a good indicator of the contemporaneous
output gap because of lagged effects on prices, in which case one must exercise caution in
reacting too strongly to inﬂation. Consequently, the overall effect of uncertainty about the output
gap on  is ambiguous.
Likewise, the implications for the response coefﬁcient  are not clear a priori. Suppose, for
instance, that in a given period, potential output is suspected to have increased and, accordingly,
higher output is observed in the economy. The true output gap is therefore negative, and large or
small depending on how quickly actual output catches up with the increase in potential. If actual
output adjusts quickly to changes in potential, then the true output gap is likely to be relatively
small, while the measured output gap, , is likely to be positive (because the measure of
potential is based on past observations) and relatively large. Under these circumstances, a more
cautious policy reaction to the measured output gap, i.e., a smaller response coefﬁcient  (than
the one without uncertainty), would be warranted. But, if actual output adjusts very slowly to the
change in potential (as might be the case in the wake of industrial restructuring or a large
technological innovation), then the true output gap is likely to be relatively large (and negative),
while the measured output gap, , is likely to be found negative but smaller than the true output
gap. A stronger reaction would be called for to help close the gap more quickly.















In any event, one is bound to make a forecast, perhaps based on judgment, about the true state
variables to infer the right monetary policy response under data uncertainty.27
4. The Case of a Small Open Economy
The analysis so far has been restricted to a closed economy. In a small open economy like Canada,
an important role in the transmission mechanism must be assigned to the exchange rate and




where  is the percentage deviation of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium (assumed for
now to be constant)—a greater e means appreciation of the domestic currency;  is a vector of
exogenous variables observed at the beginning of period t, before any monetary action is taken;
 are assumed to be white noise; and . For now, all of the model’s parameters are
assumed to be known and constant.
This is essentially the baseline closed-economy model of section 2, with the exchange rate and the
exogenous variables  added as new explanatory variables. The exchange rate affects demand
through foreign trade, and the change in the exchange rate affects inﬂation through import prices
because, for instance, foreign ﬁrms desire constant real prices in their home currencies. Exchange
27. Orphanides (1998) argues that since implementation of the rule would add noise to
thetrueoptimalrulebecauseofthemeasurementerrors,oneoughttorespondcautiouslytochangesin
measuredstatevariables.(Orphanidesusesthisargumenttoexplainwhyhistoricalmonetaryreactions
to shocks appear to be more cautious than model-based optimal reactions derived ex post from the
revised historical series of output and inﬂation.) However, this claim depends onthe assumption that
themeasurementerrorsareindeednoise,i.e.,uncorrelatedoratleastpositivelycorrelatedwiththetrue
variables so that the variances of the measured variables are greater than those of the true variables.
Butitisnotclearthatthisisthecaseforthemeasuresusedinpractice.Ofcourse,inthecasewherethe
measured variables are the best forecasts, the measurement errors are negatively correlated with the
true state variables. We suspect that isthe case for the majority of measures used, although the
variances of the measures may still be greater than the variances of the true variables. In fact, of eight
different real-time measures of the output gap listed inOrphanides and van Norden (1999, Table 1),
four have a smaller variance than the revised values of the output gap (which can be considered an
approximation of the true output gap). (See Swanson (2000) for an interpretation of Orphanides’
argument as a signal extraction problem.)
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rate ﬂuctuations are assumed to affect domestic demand and prices with a one-period lag. The
rationale for equation (17) linking the interest rate and exogenous variables to the exchange rate is
that a rise in the interest rate or such variables as commodity prices increases the demand for
domestic currency. The shock  captures other inﬂuences on the exchange rate, such as shifts in
expectations and investor conﬁdence.
4.1 Optimal rules
If the direct effect of the exchange rate on inﬂation is ignored, i.e., , then the present
Phillips curve and demand equation in equations (15) and (16) are identical to those described
earlier for the closed economy (with exogenous variables added) once the term  rather
than  is thought of as the policy instrument. In that case, it follows that the optimal rule in the
small open economy has the form
,
where the response coefﬁcients A, B, and C equal those obtained in the closed-economy case up
to the constant c.29 Thus, when the direct effect of the exchange rate on inﬂation is ignored, the
expression of the optimal rule does not require knowledge of the exchange rate-interest rate
relationship embodied in equation (17). This is particularly useful, since the exchange rate-
interest rate relationship is known to be difﬁcult to evaluate.
Dividing by , the above rule can be written in the form
,
where the weights on the real interest rate and the real exchange rate,  and , are
proportional to the coefﬁcients c and g in the demand equation. can be thought of
as a monetary conditions index (MCI).
If , then the optimal rule (18) must be adjusted to take into consideration the direct effect of
the exchange rate on inﬂation through import prices. In this case, one can show that the optimal
rule takes the form30
29. As noted in the previous section,A andBare independent of the coefﬁcients on the exogenous
variables.Moreover,if thenCequals .Toseethisclearly,thinkoftheterm
as the instrument of policy and identify the model with the closed-economy model.
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where the coefﬁcients , , and also now depend on the coefﬁcients f and h in the interest
rate-exchange rate relationship.31  Because the direct effect of the exchange rate on inﬂation is
transitory, the optimal rule calls for a response to the deviation in inﬂation that excludes the
previous period’s effect of the exchange rate, i.e., it calls for a response to the term .
The relative weight on the exchange rate, , in the case , ought always to be larger than
the relative weight, , in the case , since in the former case an increase in the
exchange rate is presumed to have a direct dampening effect on inﬂation. However, the
comparison between the optimal response coefﬁcients in the two cases is a priori ambiguous. On
the one hand, the response coefﬁcients , , and  ought to be smaller when , to the
extent that the direct effect of the exchange rate on inﬂation reinforces the desired effect of
monetary action following an inﬂationary shock. On the other hand, , , and  ought to be
larger, to the extent that the direct effect can be used to control inﬂation more quickly and this
requires a larger increase in the exchange rate than would be needed if inﬂation were affected
through demand only.
In any case, the fact that the direct effect of a change in the exchange rate on inﬂation is relatively
small and transitory implies that the cumulative effect of a change in the exchange rate on
inﬂation is also relatively small. It follows that an attempt to control inﬂation through this channel
will require large ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate, hence large ﬂuctuations in the interest rate and
output. One would therefore expect that, except in the case where the policy-maker places a
relatively large weight, , on inﬂation in the loss function, the optimal response coefﬁcients
ought to be fairly close to the response coefﬁcients obtained when one ignores the direct effects of
the exchange rate on inﬂation. In particular, the relative weights on the interest rate and the
exchange rate in the MCI introduced above should be approximately proportional to the effects
that these variables have on demand.
Table 5 conﬁrms these claims. It provides the ratio  and the optimal response coefﬁcients
 and  under the speciﬁcation
,
31. , , and , however,continue to be independent of the coefﬁcients on the vector of
exogenousvariables .Also, doesnotdependon :theeffectoftheexogenousvariablesonthe
exchange rate is subsumed in the level of the exchange rate.
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Table  5: Optimal coefﬁcients, open-economy case
f = 0.2 f = 0.0
ratio y ratio y
0.00 0.00 4.99 2.00 3.00 3.13 2.25
0.05 0.67 3.05 1.75 3.00 2.48 1.99
0.10 1.03 2.46 1.66 3.00 2.12 1.85
0.15 1.29 2.11 1.60 3.00 1.88 1.75
0.20 1.51 1.86 1.55 3.00 1.69 1.68
0.25 1.69 1.67 1.51 3.00 1.54 1.62
0.30 1.84 1.51 1.47 3.00 1.41 1.57
0.35 1.98 1.38 1.44 3.00 1.30 1.52
0.40 2.10 1.26 1.41 3.00 1.20 1.48
0.45 2.21 1.16 1.38 3.00 1.11 1.44
0.50 2.31 1.07 1.36 3.00 1.02 1.41
0.55 2.40 0.98 1.33 3.00 0.94 1.38
0.60 2.48 0.89 1.31 3.00 0.87 1.35
0.65 2.56 0.81 1.28 3.00 0.79 1.32
0.70 2.63 0.73 1.26 3.00 0.72 1.29
0.75 2.70 0.65 1.23 3.00 0.64 1.26
0.80 2.77 0.57 1.21 3.00 0.57 1.23
0.85 2.83 0.49 1.18 3.00 0.48 1.19
0.90 2.89 0.39 1.15 3.00 0.39 1.16
0.95 2.94 0.27 1.11 3.00 0.27 1.11
0.99 2.99 0.12 1.05 3.00 0.12 1.05
a
pp31
as well as the optimal response coefﬁcients A and B when  is assumed to equal 0. Figure 3 plots
the efﬁciency frontier, the frontier associated with the optimal rules derived under the assumption
, and the frontier associated with the optimal rules derived under the assumption
and adjusted to exclude the transitory effects of the exchange rate on inﬂation.
It is apparent that, in the middle range of values for , the rules derived under the assumption
 and that respond only to inﬂation that excludes transitory effects of the exchange rate
rather than overall inﬂation are nearly as efﬁcient as the fully optimal rules. In contrast, rules that
respond to overall inﬂation, and hence to transitory effects of the exchange rate, can lead to
unstable outcomes.
f
f 0 = f 0 =
a
f 0 =32
Figure 3: Efﬁciency frontiers
For example, when an equal weight is placed on output and price stability ( ), the
optimum rule under the speciﬁcations above is
,
and the variances of output and inﬂation are respectively 4.29 and 2.69. If the indirect effect of the
exchange rate on inﬂation is ignored, i.e., , then the adjusted optimal rule would be
,












unadjusted optimal rules under f=0













Figure 4: Efficiency Frontiers
Note: The straight diagonal segment in the graph above is a ﬂuke of the program, and should be ignored.
It corresponds to cases that do not, in fact, admit ﬁnite variances.
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and the variances of output and inﬂation would be respectively 4.22 and 2.82, whereas the
unadjusted optimal rule would be
,
and the variances of output and inﬂation would be 4.85 and 3.56, respectively.
Static changes in , , and the model’s parameters can be shown to have similar effects on the
response coefﬁcients as in the closed-economy case (see section 3), whereas the effect on the
relative weight  can be ambiguous. It is worth mentioning, however, that a decrease in the
degree of persistence of inﬂation, a, leads the policy-maker to respond less sharply to inﬂationary
shocks, hence to put less weight on autonomous exchange rate shocks, i.e., to choose a larger ratio
.
4.2 Supply shocks
So far, potential output, the equilibrium interest rate, and the equilibrium real exchange rate have
been assumed to be constant (or at least growing at a steady rate in the case of potential output).
Suppose now that these variables vary in time—denote them , , and  respectively.
Potential output may vary because of productivity shocks, changes in the supply of factors of
production, or structural changes in the economy. The equilibrium interest rate and equilibrium
real exchange rate may vary as a result of changes in potential output (e.g., changes in
productivity) or because of autonomous factors, such as changes in the risk premium due to
domestic or external shocks or changes in commodity prices. The three variables are therefore
closely, but not perfectly, correlated.
If the economy adjusts symmetrically to changes in supply, e.g., potential output and demand, and
to changes in the actual and equilibrium interest rates and exchange rates, then what matters for
the conduct of monetary policy are the deviations of the state variables from equilibrium. Whether
the deviations are driven by a demand shock or a supply shock is immaterial. Thus, an increase in
potential output, which translates into a drop in the output gap, would call for a similar ease in
monetary conditions relative to equilibrium as would a decrease in demand. However, whether
this implies an increase or a decrease of the level of the MCI depends on whether the equilibrium
level of the MCI has risen in relation to the change in potential output, and by how much.
An autonomous change in the equilibrium level of the monetary conditions index that is unrelated
to a change in contemporaneous potential output, on the other hand, ought to be accommodated
by a similar change in the actual level of monetary conditions. For example, an autonomous drop
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in the exchange rate, resulting from portfolio rebalancing and accompanied by an ensuing
increase in equilibrium (e.g., long-run) interest rates, ought to be accommodated by a
corresponding increase in (short-term) interest rates.32
4.3 Parameter uncertainty
Consider now the case where the coefﬁcients c and g on the interest rate and the exchange rate in
the demand equation are uncertain. As in the closed-economy case with c random, such
uncertainty calls for more cautious monetary responses to shocks, i.e., smaller response
coefﬁcients, , , and , than in the case where all parameters are known (see [S]). The
direction in which the weights  and  ought to be adjusted, however, depends on the
relative degrees of uncertainty on c and g: a larger degree of uncertainty on the coefﬁcient g of the
exchange rate requires a larger response to autonomous changes in the exchange rate, hence a
larger weight  on the exchange rate in the policy rule, in order to reduce the uncertainty of
the effects of the exchange rate on demand.
Table 6 provides the optimal coefﬁcients and weights under alternative assumptions about the
magnitude of the parameter uncertainty and different choices of the relative weight  in the loss
function. The table also provides the variances of output and inﬂation under the optimal rule as
well as under the optimal rule that ignores uncertainty. Figure 4 plots the efﬁciency frontier in the
case where the standard deviations on c and g are 0.3 and 0.2 respectively, as well as the frontier
associated with the optimal rules that ignore uncertainty. As in the closed-economy case, ignoring
uncertainty leads more to a lateral displacement of the efﬁciency frontier than to a level shift.
32. OnesmallqualiﬁcationtothepreviousargumentisthatinthePhillipscurve,inﬂationoughttodepend
on the change in the level of the exchange rate, which isnot the same as the change in the deviation of
the exchange rate from equilibrium if the equilibrium exchange rate is not constant. As argued in the
previous section, however, this should have little consequence for the optimal rule, given the small
magnitude and transitional nature of the direct effects of the exchange rate on inﬂation.
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Table 6: Response coefﬁcients and variances
ratio y var( ) var(y) varc() varc(y)
0.25 1.69 1.67 1.51 1.91 5.65
0.50 2.31 1.07 1.36 2.69 4.29
0.75 2.70 0.65 1.23 4.02 3.52
0.25 2.04 1.50 1.38 2.04 6.01 1.95 6.32
0.50 2.71 0.96 1.23 2.87 4.55 2.75 4.72
0.75 3.13 0.59 1.11 4.29 3.74 4.10 3.83
0.25 1.63 1.62 1.48 1.96 5.82 1.93 5.93
0.50 2.16 1.04 1.33 2.77 4.42 2.72 4.47
0.75 2.49 0.64 1.21 4.13 3.63 4.05 3.66
0.25 1.47 1.49 1.39 2.14 6.32 1.99 6.96
0.50 1.81 0.96 1.24 3.02 4.79 2.80 5.14
0.75 2.01 0.60 1.13 4.50 3.94 4.18 4.14
0.25 1.96 1.46 1.35 2.10 6.18 1.97 6.68
0.50 2.53 0.93 1.20 2.96 4.68 2.78 4.95
0.75 2.88 0.58 1.09 4.41 3.84 4.14 3.99
0.25 1.75 1.34 1.27 2.31 6.70 2.05 8.04
0.50 2.11 0.87 1.13 3.25 5.07 2.88 5.79














Figure 4: Efﬁciency frontiers
5. Estimated VARs
The previous results relied on calibrated models. In this section, we estimate the transmission
mechanism in Canada by means of a vector autoregression (VAR), and derive the optimal rules
associated with this model. The VAR involves two blocks of variables. One consists of the United
States growth in real GDP, the percentage change in a real non-energy commodity price index, the
percentage change in the price of oil, a measure of the United States CPI inﬂation rate, and the
United States real federal funds rate. This block of variables is assumed to be exogenous,
reﬂecting the fact that Canada is a small economy. The second block consists of the Canadian
output gap, inﬂation, the percentage change in the Canada-U.S. real exchange rate, and the real
yield spread, that is, the difference between the 90-day prime corporate paper and the 10-year-
sc 0.3 sg , 0.2 ==
























Figure 6: Efficiency Frontiers s
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and-over Government of Canada bond yield average deﬂated by the CPI inﬂation rate, excluding
food and energy and the effect of changes in indirect taxes. We view the real yield spread as a
proxy for the deviation of the short-term real interest rate, or instrument of monetary policy, from
its equilibrium.
The data cover the period from 1961 to 1999, at annual frequency. The measure of real GDP in the
United States is the U.S. Department of Commerce chain volume real GDP measure, in 1996
prices, seasonally adjusted at annual rates. The inﬂation measure is the log difference of the CPI,
excluding food and energy. The measure of output in Canada is the real GDP in 1992 prices,33
seasonally adjusted at annual rates, and the measure of inﬂation is the log difference of the CPI,
excluding food, energy, and the effect of changes in indirect taxes. Real crude oil prices and the
real non-energy commodity price index are both in U.S. dollars deﬂated by the U.S. consumer
price index (excluding food and energy). The real exchange rate is deﬁned as the U.S.-Canada
nominal exchange rate (e.g., the price of a unit of domestic currency in terms of the U.S.
currency) multiplied by the ratio of the Canadian GDP deﬂator to the U.S. GDP deﬂator.
The VAR is identiﬁed via standard Choleski decompositions, where the variables are ordered in
the manner they are listed above. The monetary policy instrument is placed last to capture the idea
that monetary policy may adjust to current events but its effects on output and prices occur with a
lag.  A single lag on each variable is used, and the coefﬁcient on lagged inﬂation in the output
equation is constrained to equal 0.
Table 7 provides the estimated reduced-form Canadian demand equation and Phillips curve. One
apparent difference with the stylized model used earlier is that while the coefﬁcient on the lagged
real yield spread in the Phillips curve is smaller than in the output equation, it is nevertheless
signiﬁcant.
In deriving the optimal rules, a weight of 0.05 on changes in the real yield spread was
incorporated in the loss function.34 Incorporating such a weight has little effect on the loss due to
output and inﬂation variability under the optimal rule, but it reduces substantially the variability of
interest rates. The latter is implausibly large without such a constraint. The presence of such a
weight also implies that the optimal reaction function will involve a certain degree of persistence
(represented by a coefﬁcient on lagged interest rates) in addition to responses to deviations of
inﬂation, output, and the exchange rate from equilibrium.
33. Our measures do notincorporate the changes in the measures of GDP in the national accounts since
May 2001. For real GDP at market prices, these changes involve a move to chain volume measures,
while those for real GDP at factor cost involve a move to real GDP at basic prices.
34. In other words, the loss function now has the form
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Table 8 shows the optimal response coefﬁcients, and Figure 5 plots the efﬁciency frontier when
the economy is subject only to domestic shocks. For example, when an equal weight is placed on
output and inﬂation variability, the optimal rule is
Table 7: Reduced-form estimated equations
Variable output equation inﬂation equation
Constant –0.22  (0.83) 0.40  (0.50)
U.S. gap 0.43  (0.07) 0.11  (0.42)
Oil –0.01  (0.48) 0.01  (0.40)
Commodity prices 0.05  (0.09) 0.04  (0.03)
U.S. inﬂation –0.24  (0.20) 0.30  (0.02)




Canada gap 0.35  (0.26) 0.46  (0.02)
Real exchange rate –0.05  (0.48) –0.09  (0.02)
Real yield spread –0.49  (0.02) –0.28  (0.08)39
Table 8: Response coefﬁcients based on estimated VAR
0.05 0.56 0.62 –0.15 0.16
0.10 0.52 0.61 –0.15 0.15
0.15 0.49 0.60 –0.14 0.15
0.20 0.43 0.59 –0.14 0.15
0.25 0.43 0.58 –0.13 0.15
0.30 0.40 0.58 –0.13 0.15
0.35 0.37 0.57 –0.12 0.10
0.40 0.34 0.56 –0.12 0.15
0.45 0.31 0.55 –0.12 0.14
0.50 0.28 0.55 –0.11 0.14
0.55 0.25 0.54 –0.11 0.14
0.60 0.22 0.53 –0.10 0.14
0.65 0.19 0.53 –0.10 0.14
0.70 0.16 0.52 –0.09 0.14
0.75 0.14 0.51 –0.09 0.14
0.80 0.11 0.51 –0.09 0.14
0.85 0.08 0.50 –0.08 0.14
0.90 0.05 0.49 –0.08 0.14
0.95 0.02 0.48 –0.07 0.14
apy Der 1 – ()40
Figure 5: Efﬁciency frontier based on the estimated VAR
.
The long-run responses to output and inﬂation are therefore 0.64 and 0.32, respectively. Rules




achieve almost equal total loss with respect to output and inﬂation variability alone compared
with the optimal rule—the variances of output and inﬂation are 0.53 and 0.47 for the former rule,
and 0.54 and 0.44 for the latter—but the variability of the interest rate is almost twice as large.
Interestingly, omitting the response to the change in the exchange rate from the optimal rules,
shifts the efﬁciency frontier signiﬁcantly to the right (see Figure 5).
In so far as the outcomes of the optimal rules for values of the weight  in the middle range are
fairly close to each other, the results based on the estimated VAR are consistent with those
obtained earlier with calibrated models when the degree of persistence in inﬂation, a, is relatively
small.
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6. Conclusion
This paper explores the role that Taylor-type rules may play in the conduct of monetary policy. In
contrast to the literature that examines efﬁcient rules in the context of large macroeconometric
models, this paper uses small, stylized, calibrated, backward-looking models. Although these
models are simplistic, and subject to the Lucas critique, they can still act as a very useful
benchmark for more complex models, and they are easily amenable to investigating the
robustness of rules and the effects of uncertainty.
We showed that if the degree of persistence of inﬂation in the Phillips curve is not high (below
0.5, for example), then a simple rule that mostly offsets demand shocks, and puts a relatively
small weight on inﬂation shocks, is efﬁcient. Furthermore, such a rule appears to be robust to
alternative preferences regarding the relative weight on inﬂation and output stability, the presence
of diverse exogenous variables and, as long as the model’s key relationships are relatively stable,
parameter uncertainty.
We would therefore submit that a Taylor-type rule such as the above, for example, one that puts a
weight 0.75 or 1 on the output gap, a weight 0.5 on deviations of inﬂation from target, a small
degree of persistence in policy and, in the case of Canada, perhaps a small negative response to
changes in the exchange rate, can act as a reasonable benchmark for monetary policy responses to
domestic shocks. Inevitably, of course, uncertainty and the diversity of shocks affecting the
economy  require policy-makers to adjust their policy responses to particular events as
appropriate on a case-by-case basis.
This type of rule differs from the type usually found in the literature in the context of established
macroeconometric models. However, these studies assume commitment to the rule, whereas the
optimal rules derived in this paper are better compared with time-consistent rules. We have argued
that time-consistent rules are more reasonable choices for public policy. Nonetheless, since the
models we used are backward-looking, it would be most useful (and relatively easy) to examine
how the introduction of forward-looking elements in the model might affect efficient rules. And
finally, although we provide some results in the open-economy case, our main focus has been on
domestic shocks. Further study is needed to analyze responses to foreign shocks.42
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Appendix A. Comparative Statics
Elementary algebraic manipulation shows that k is a constant between 0 and a which increases
with  and a, and decreases with d and ; k is, however, independent from the parameters b and
c in the IS curve. The interpretation is as follows.
The coefﬁcient k reﬂects the trade-off between inﬂation and output as witnessed by the Phillips
curve: bringing inﬂation down requires a temporary output contraction; the greater the output
contraction, the greater the drop in inﬂation.1 If no weight is placed on output stability ( ),
then the policy-maker will attempt to achieve the inﬂation target as quickly as possible ( ),
but at the cost of large ﬂuctuations in output. If a positive weight is placed on output stability
( ), then following a shock the policy-maker will bring inﬂation back to its initial target
more slowly ( ) so as to reduce the ﬂuctuations in output—the greater is the weight  on
output stability, the larger is the coefﬁcient k and the more gradual is the adjustment of inﬂation.
At the other extreme where the policy-maker is targeting only output (i.e., ), inﬂation
returns to the target at the speed implied by the degree of mean reversion in the Phillips curve:
.
A larger coefﬁcient a means that inﬂation is more persistent,2 and would therefore return more
slowly to the target level, ceteris paribus, hence k will be larger; whereas a larger d means that
inﬂation responds more strongly to changes in the output gap, hence inﬂation will return more
quickly to target, ceteris paribus, and k will be smaller. A larger  means that a smaller weight is
placed on short-run variations. To the extent that variations in output are needed early to stabilize
inﬂation, a larger  implies that a smaller weight is placed on output variability, and therefore
leads to a greater speed of adjustment, i.e., a smaller k.3
Similarly, one can verify that the response coefﬁcients A and B in the optimal instrument rule (6)
increase with a and , and decrease with . The interpretation is as follows. A larger a implies a
more persistent inﬂation, and therefore requires sharper monetary policy responses to reduce
deviations in inﬂation. A larger  means that a smaller weight is placed on short-run variations
1. Note that from equations (2) and (6), under the optimal policy rule, the dynamics governing the
movement of the output gap are summarized by
.
A positive output gap at timet or an inﬂation rate that is higher than the target level leads toa negative
output gap next period.
2. Itmaybemorepersistentbecausethecentralbank’spolicyislesscredibleorbecauseagentsaremore
backward-looking.
3. We thank Pierre Duguay for that observation.
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and therefore induces stronger immediate reaction to shocks. It is sometimes mistakenly thought
that a greater weight, , on output stability calls for a greater output-response coefﬁcient, A. This
is not true in the present case because, following an inﬂationary shock, the actions taken by the
monetary authorities are intended to achieve a temporary output contraction. Greater concern
about output stability therefore implies that the output contraction should not be as sharp, hence it
requires a smaller coefﬁcient A; similarly for B.
A increases with d, whereas B decreases with d: the larger is the coefﬁcient d on output in the
Phillips curve, i.e., the larger is the effect of an output gap on future prices, the larger ought to be
the output response coefﬁcient A, in order to offset the greater expected deviation in inﬂation
following a demand shock. But the smaller ought to be the inﬂation response coefﬁcient B, since a
smaller change in output is needed to achieve the desired effect on future inﬂation.
A increases with b, whereas B is independent from b: the larger is the coefﬁcient b on output in the
demand equation, i.e., the more persistent are changes in demand, the greater ought to be the
response to a demand shock. In other words, the larger ought to be the output response coefﬁcient
A in order to offset the greater expected future output gap.
Finally, for obvious reasons, the optimal response coefﬁcients A and B are inversely proportional
to the real interest rate demand elasticity, c.
It must be emphasized that the above comparative results depend heavily on the speciﬁcation of
the loss function and the dynamic structure of the model, in particular the frequency of the data.
However, similar types of interpretation ought to apply in general. For example, it may turn out
that in a more complex model, say with quarterly data or perhaps a concern for interest rate
variability incorporated in the objective function, the optimal rule calls for a smaller positive,
rather than an immediately negative, output gap in the quarter following a positive demand shock.
In that case, a greater weight, , on output stability is likely to call for a greater, not smaller,
response coefﬁcient on contemporaneous output in order to further close the output gap in the
quarter following a shock.
a
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Appendix B. Commitment Versus Discretion: An Example
Consider the following model4
, (B1)
and suppose that, at time t, the loss function is the expected discounted sum of squared deviations
of inﬂation from a target (assumed equal to 0), e.g.,
. (B2)
Clearly,  if in every period of time, policy-makers take bygones as bygones and seek to minimize
the loss function described above, then, at time t forward, unless there is a new shock, ,  they
would set output equal to 0 so as to achieve 0 inﬂation. Under the time-consistent optimal rule, the
public would therefore expect future output and inﬂation to equal 0, hence , in which case
the unconditional variance of inﬂation would equal the variance of , say normalized to equal 1.
As an alternative policy, suppose now that policy-makers commit to the rule
. (B3)
One can then show that inﬂation follows the process
, (B4)
where , in which case the unconditional variance of inﬂation would equal ,
which is smaller than 1. Thus, the time-consistent optimal rule does not perform as well as the
alternative rule under commitment.
4. The notation is standard.
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Appendix C. Solution to the Linear-Quadratic
Problem Under Uncertainty




where and are negative semi-deﬁnite symmetric matrices of random weights, is a vector
of state variables, is a vector of control variables, is a vector of random shocks, and and
 are matrices of random parameters.  is not necessarily observed at time t: let  be the
forecast error, .
We assume that learning is passive. That is, in every period T, the policy-makers assume that
actions taken at time T or earlier do not to affect the joint distribution of
 conditional on all information available at time .
Note that this assumption is fully rational if the series of parameters
is independently distributed over time. Let denote the value
function at time t.
Case A. Suppose that  is observed at time t, before actions are taken.
We conjecture that   has the form
,
where is a positive semi-deﬁnite symmetric matrix, is a vector, and is a scalar. , ,
and  are assumed to be unaffected by past choices of the control variable.
From the Bellman equation,
one derives the ﬁrst-order equation,
Et d
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Substituting back the expression of into the Bellman equation and expanding in terms of
, one obtains
.
Comparing the latter expression with that of , it follows that
Et dB¢t 1 + Pt 1 + Zt 1 + dB¢t 1 + Wt 1 + Qtut ++ [] 0 =
Zt 1 + Zt
ut FtZt Gt + =
Ft d – Et Qt dB¢ + t 1 + Pt 1 + Bt 1 + []
1 – Et B¢t 1 + Pt 1 + At 1 + [] =
Gt d – Et Qt dB¢ + t 1 + Pt 1 + Bt 1 + []
1 – Et B¢t 1 + Pt 1 + et 1 + B¢t 1 + Wt 1 + + [] =
ut Zt 1 +
Zt
Vt Et Z¢tRtZt u¢tQtut dZ¢t 1 + Pt 1 + Zt 1 + 2dZ¢t 1 + Wt 1 + ddt 1 + ++ } ++ { =
Et Z¢tRtZt {} d Et Z¢tA¢t 1 + Pt 1 + At 1 + Zt {} Et u¢t Qt dB¢t 1 + Pt 1 + Bt 1 + + [] ut {} ++ =
2dEt u¢tB¢t 1 + Pt 1 + At 1 + Zt u¢tB¢t 1 + Pt 1 + et 1 + Z¢tA¢t 1 + Pt 1 + et 1 + ++ {} +
dEt 2Z¢tA¢t 1 + Wt 1 + 2u¢tB¢t 1 + Wt 1 + 2e¢t 1 + Wt 1 + e¢t 1 + Pt 1 + et 1 + dt 1 + ++ + + { } +
Et Z¢tRtZt {} d Et Z¢tA¢t 1 + Pt 1 + At 1 + Zt {} + =
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dEt e¢t 1 + Pt 1 + et 1 + 2e¢t 1 + Wt 1 + dt 1 + ++ {} +
Et Z¢tRtZt {} d Et Z¢tA¢t 1 + Pt 1 + At 1 + Zt Z¢tA¢t 1 + Pt 1 + Bt 1 + FtZt + {} + =
dEt 2Z¢tA¢t 1 + Wt 1 + Z¢tF¢tB¢t 1 + Wt 1 + Z¢tA¢t 1 + Pt 1 + Bt 1 + Gt e¢t 1 + Pt 1 + Bt 1 + FtZt ++ + { } +
dEt 2Z¢tA¢t 1 + Pt 1 + et 1 + {} +
dEt Gt¢B¢t 1 + Wt 1 + 2e¢t 1 + Wt 1 + e¢t 1 + Pt 1 + et 1 + e¢t 1 + Pt 1 + Bt 1 + Gt dt 1 + ++ + + {} +
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assuming that these implicit equations do have solutions. Given the data-generating process of the
model’s parameters, , one can solve numerically for the matrices  and ,
and hence for the coefﬁcients,  and , in the optimal rule.
Note that  and therefore the optimal response vector  in the optimal rule, depend solely on
the  distributions of , , , and , conditional on all information available as of time
t. , and hence the optimal response vector  in the optimal rule, depend on the distributions
of all the model’s parameters, , , , , and , conditional on all information
available as of time t.
In general,  and  will vary with the information acquired over time. If the data-generating
process governing  is stationary, then so will be  and .
If we suppose that  and  are exogenously given, so that  and
, and the parameters are independently and identically distributed over
time, then , and therefore the optimal response vector , are constant.
If, moreover,  is white noise (speciﬁcally,  at all t) and independent from
, then  and , and the vector 0 is a
trivial solution for . In that case, , and the optimal rule reduces to the usual form
.5
More generally, if  and , where  is an autonomous
vector observed at time t and unaffected by the control variable, , and and are white noise
shocks that are independent from , , , , , and , jointly, then
, and
5. This of course applies in particular to the case where all of the model’s parameters are constant.
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. It follows that  for some
vector , which depends on the distributions of , , , , , and , conditional on
information available as of time t. In that case, the optimal rule takes the form
for some vector of coefﬁcients , which depends on the  distributions of , , , , ,
and , conditional on information available as of time t. If  are independently
and identically distributed over time, then  is constant. Then, one can use the identity
 and equation (2) to evaluate numerically the covariance matrix
 under the optimal rule.
Case B (data uncertainty). Suppose that the parameters  are known and
constant, but  is not observed at time t. Then, the optimal rule is identical to the optimal rule
found in the previous case, where there is no uncertainty about the data, except that it is expressed
in terms of the forecasts of , i.e., it has the form
,
where  and  are as described above. To see this formally, deﬁne the new state variables
. (Recall .) Note that the objective function can be written
Since , and learning is assumed to be passive, and the policy instrument is assumed
not to affect the distribution of the forecast error, , minimizing this objective function is
equivalent to minimizing the function
.
Then, apply the results of the previous section to the model
,
where . (Note that  is white noise if  is.)
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